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mission of records made in the regular course of business, including
hospital records, required a foundation of testimony by the entrant or
a showing that the entrant was dead, insane or beyond the jurisdiction
of the court. In 1963 the Wisconsin Supreme Court, under its court
rules power, promulgated a new statute similar to the federal shop-book
rule whch does not require such a foundation or showing for regular
entries. But, the court qualified the federal rule by exempting hospital
records containing medical diagnosis or opinion from the rule. Shortly
thereafter the legislature repealed the statute as created by the supreme
court and enacted the currently existing section 327.25 which is in
substance the same as the federal shop-book rule. Under the federal
rule, in the majority of circuits, hospital records made in the regular
course of business and containing medical diagnosis and opinion are
admissible without testimony by the entrant. Under the reenactment
rule of construction the Wisconsin statute should now be similarly
construed. However, the recent Zweiffe124 case indicates that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has not forgotten the~restriction they originally placed upon the shop-book rule in re medical diagnosis and
opinion. It is concluded that any future decision recognizing the force
of this now repealed exception to the shop-book rule will clearly be
contrary to the existing section 327.25 and the applicable rule governing its construction. However, this conclusion is not intended to reflect
the author's opinion to the relative merit of either the court's or the
legislature's version of the statute.
It might further be noted that even if the court should hold that
medical records containing diagnosis and opinion do not fall within
the purview of the regular entry exception to the hearsay rule as
embodied in the shop-book rule, this would not preclude a doctor other
that the original entrant from forming and testifying as to an opinion
based on the records even though the records were not admissible in
evidence.
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Unauthorized Practice of Law: Necessity of Executor to Appear by Attorney in Probate Proceeding--Petitioner J. Gordon
Baker's mother died testate, naming him executor in her will. Petitioner, also a residuary legatee of a one-fourth share of the estate,
retained attorneys, who appeared for him at the beginning of the probate proceedings. A petition to probate the will was filed, the will was
admitted, and petitioner was appointed executor. An inventory was
filed, disclosing personal property of $167,863.14 and real estate worth
$4,000.
24
25

Zweiffel, supra note 22.
See Sundquist v. Madison Railways C. (1928) 197 Wis. 83, 221 N.W. 392, followed in Chapnitsky v. McClove (1962) 20 Wis. 2d 453, 122 N.W. 2d 400.
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At this point, attorneys for petitioner informed him that their fee
upon completion of the proceeding would be $4,800, based on the
state bar minimum fee schedule, but subject to the court's determination of reasonableness. Feeling that the fee so computed was excessive, petitioner paid the attorneys for the work performed to date and
they withdrew. Petitioner did not retain another attorney, but personally prepared and presented to the court the following papers:
1) His final account and petition for allowance thereof;
2) A proposed notice of hearing on final account and determination of inheritance tax;
3) A proposed order determining inheritance tax; and
4) A proposed final judgment determining the distribution of personalty, assigning the interest in the real estate and terminating
a life tenancy in other real estate.
County Court Judge Roang informed petitioner that since he, as
executor, was acting for others, he was engaged in the practice of
law, and would have to retain an attorney. Petitioner refused, and the
papers were returned to him. Petitioner then sought a writ of mandamus from the Wisconsin Supreme Court. An alternative writ was
issued, and Judge Roang made a return to it.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in denying the executor's petition
for a writ of mandamus, held in State ex rel, Baker v. County Court'
that, in general, the presentation of probate matters to the county court
for adjudication is the practice of law and therefore subject to the
court's control.
The supreme court, relying mainly upon article VII, sections 2
and 32 of the Wisconsin constitution has consistently held that it has
the power to regulate the practice of law in Wisconsin. The court reaffirmed this power in the recent case of State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Dinger, where it concluded that the regulation of the practice of the
law is a judicial power and is vested exclusively in the supreme court;
that the practitioner in or out of court, licensed lawyer or layman, is
subject to such regulation; that whenever the court's view of the public
interest requires it, the court has the power to make appropriate regulations concerning the practice of law in the interest of the administration of justice, and to modify or declare void any such rule, law, or
129 Wis. 2d 1, 138 N.W. 2d 162 (1965).
Wis. CONST. art. V11, §2 provides in part, "The judicial power of this state,
both as to matters of law and equity, shall be vested in a supreme court,
circuit courts, courts of probate, and in justices of the peace"; art. VII, §3
provides in part, "The supreme court shall have a general superintending
control over all inferior courts."
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regulation by whomever promulgated, which appears to the court to
interfere with the court's control of such practice for such ends.'
While some courts have attempted to develop an all-inclusive definition of the practice of law, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has followed
that general trend of judicial decisions which has determined each case
of unauthorized practice of law upon its own particular facts.4 In the
past, Wisconsin cases have discussed the unauthorized practice of law
with respect to real estate brokers, 5 insurance adjusters,6 and appearances before administrative agencies,7 among other situations. However, no prior Wisconsin case has discussed an unauthorized practice
of law issue concerning the functions of an individual executor, who
is personally interested in the estate. Indeed, this appears to be a
matter of first impression in the entire nation.
In holding that the executor was engaged in the practice of law, and
therefore subject to the supreme court's control, the court found that
the petitioner had acted in behalf of another, thereby subjecting himself
to section 256.30(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes, which provides:
Every person who shall appear as agent, representative or
attorney, for or on behalf of any other person, or any firm,
copartnership, association or corporation in any action or proceeding in or before any court of record, court commissioner,
or judicial tribunal of the United States, or of any state, or
who shall otherwise, in or out of court for compensation or
pecuniary reward give professional legal advice not incidental
to his usual or ordinary business, or render any legal service
for any other person, or any firm, copartnership, association or
corporation, shall be deemed to be practicing law within the
meaning of this section s
As the county court is a court of record, 9 it is necessary to show
only that the executor of an estate is acting in behalf of others, or as
a representative of the rights of others, to prove that his acts constitute the practice of law as defined in the statute. Keeping the principle in mind that each case of alleged unauthorized practice of law
is to be decided on its particular facts, we must examine the acts of
Baker, the executor, through which he indicated to the court that he
had properly performed his duties; that the beneficiaries were entitled
3 State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 4 Wis. 2d 193, 206, 109 N.W. 2d 685, 692
(1960).
4 State ex reL Junior Association of the Milwaukee Bar v. Rice, 236 Wis. 38,
294 N.W. 550 (1940).
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W. 2d 685 (1961).
6 State ex reL. Junior Association of the Milwaukee Bar v. Rice, 236 Wis. 38,
294 N.W. 550 (1940).
7State ex rel. State Bar v. Keller, 16 Wis. 2d 377, 114 N.W. 2d 796 (1962).
s WIs. STAT. §256.30(2) (1963).
(1963) provides in part, "There is established in each
9 VIs. STAT. §253.01
county a county court which is a court of record . . ."
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to distribution in certain proportions; that the state was entitled to
certain amounts of taxes; and that the court should hear and determine
these matters and enter appropriate orders and judgment. 10
Wisconsin courts have long held that an executor or administrator
serves as the representative of the rights of those interested in the
estate. This principle has often been affirmed by the supreme court,
with such statements as: "Speaking generally, an executor as weli as
an administrator is a trustee for the benefit of the beneficiaries naned
in the will" ;" "The relation of the executor to the heirs was fiduchry
. ..,,;1" "[T]he executor . . . represents the interests of the eslte,
including the collective interests of all legatees ....-13
The relation between the executor and the beneficiaries was cefinitively presented in Estate of Hughes, as follows:
While it is true .. .that an administrator does not represent a particular heir, he is the arm of the court employed under
the law to collect and distribute the estate of the deceased. His
interest in the estate is not and cannot be personal. To a certain
extent he also represents the heirs of the deceased for it is in
their interest that the law provides for the distribution of the
estate by an administrator. An executor represents the testator,
and it is part of his duty to see that the will of the testator is
properly executed. He likewise represents1 4 the legatees for whose
benefit the probate proceedings are had.'
The supreme court then held that the executor, when performng
his duty of proposing to the county court an adjudication of he
beneficiaries' rights which conforms to the law, is acting as a repesentative of the beneficiaries. Therefore, his presentation of stch
matters to the court for adjudication constitutes the practice of lay.
From this, the supreme court concluded: "When the executor is rot
an attorney, such matters must be presented for him by an attorrmy
licensed to practice law."' 5
The mere fact that probate proceedings in a court of record xe
recognized as the practice of law is neither a new nor a novel coaclusion. Several state courts have held that probate proceedings coi10 State ex rel. Baker v. County Court, 29 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 138 N.W. 2d 162, 15

(1965).

"'Will of Robinson, 218 Wis. 596, 602, 261 N.W. 725, 728 (1935).
Will of Raebhen, 230 Wis. 215, 222, 283 N.W. 815, 818 (1939).
13 Will of Hughes, 241 Wis. 257, 259, 5 N.W. 2d 791, 792 (1942) ; see also Estae
of Greenwald, 17 Wis. 2d 533, 117 N.W. 2d 609 (1962).
14 Will of Hughes, supra note 13, at 263, 5 N.W. 2d at 794; see also Wis. STITr.
§112.01(1) (b) (1963), which provides in part, "Fiduciary includes a truste
under any trust, expressed, implied, resulting or constructive, executor, aministrator . . ."; 33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators §142, "An execut
or administrator acts in a representative capacity and occupies a position ,f

trust with respect to those interested in the estate."

15 State ex rel. Baker v. County Court, 29 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 138 N.W. 2d 162, 16

(1965).
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stitute the practice of law, the conduct of which is proper only when
performed by one authorized and licensed to practice law. On this
theory, Michigan has held it to be unlawful for a loan broker to
practice in probate court for a fee ;16 Nebraska found the performance
of administrative acts in probate court by one not an attorney, and a
stranger to the estate, to be the practice of law ;1" Idaho fined an ex
probate judge, no longer licensed to practice law, for advising parties
and preparing probate papers as practicing law illegally ;s and Washingion held that a law clerk, who was not licensed to practice law,
had practiced law illegally by appearing in probate court for parties
and presenting papers in the settlement of the estate.19
However, the above cited cases may all be distinguished from the
Wisconsin case herein discussed. In those cases, the persons who were
accused of the unauthorized practice of law were in no manner persotally interested in the estates. They were only involved in the probae proceedings because they were retained by the beneficiaries to act
in iheir behalf, and in no case were those persons the executor named
in :he will, as was petitioner Baker. Therefore, the Wisconsin Supreme
Coart was not faced with an individual who wrongfully represented
hirself as having the power of an attorney, thereby causing others to
sedk his assistance in the probate matter. Petitioner Baker had made
no such misrepresentation, but was merely acting as directed by the
whl of the decedent, as a party interested in the estate.
In addition, courts in several other states have held that the perfamance of probate functions by licensed attorneys on behalf of
naned corporate executors was an unauthorized practice of law.2 0
Ebwever, these cases may be distinguished from Wisconsin's Baker
d(cision in that the former all involved professional corporate banking
fituciaries as the named executor. The attorneys in all of those cases
wee employed by the corporate fiduciary, which received the legal
fees charged by their employed attorneys. The executor in each case
,was barred from the probate proceedings because its acts amounted to
the unauthorized practice of law by a banking corporation, in violation of
tie general principle that only licensed individuals may practice law.
'This conclusion is best stated in the case of In re Otterness,2" where
tte Minnesota Supreme Court held:
1,Grand Rapids Bar Association v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377 (1939).
"'State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N.W. 282 (1937).
lEjn re Brainard, 55 Idaho 153, 39 P. 2d 769 (1934).
" Perris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 19 P. 2d 942 (1933).
2State Bar Association of Connecticut v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 146
Conn. 556, 153 A. 2d 453 (1959); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W.
318 (1930); Arkansas Bar Association v. Union National Bank of Little
Rock, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W. 2d 408 (1954) ; Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank
& Trust Co., 393 S.W. 2d 778 (Ky. 1965).
2In re Otterness, supra note 20.
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Neither a corporation nor a layman, not admitted to practice, can practice law, nor indirectly practice law by hiring a
licensed attorney to practice law for others for the benefit or
profit of such hirer. For this bank to employ defendant to conduct law business generally for others, for the benefit and profit
of the bank, amounted to the unlawful practice of law by the
bank ....=
Therefore, the true significance and uniqueness of the Wisconsin
case rests on the fact that the named executor, Baker, who was a
personally interested individual, was barred from proceeding with the
probate and administration of the estate unless he appeared by an attorney. This case involved neither a stranger to the estate, nor a corporate fiduciary, as have cases in the past.
Accepting the court's decision that an executor, in representing the
rights of another is practicing law and must therefore either be an
attorney or retain legal counsel, several questions arise. When must an
execufor act through an attorney? Is it necessary for an attorney to
perform all of the executor's duties, which range from the purely administrative or custodial, such as gathering the assets, to the presentation of matters in court for adjudication?
In answering these questions, two distinct approaches may be used.
We may first look to the general regulatory principles which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has promulgated concerning the practice of law
in areas other than probate proceedings; or, in the alternative, we may
examine the specific duties of an executor 3 and determine which of
22
23

1d. at 255, 232 N.W. at 319.
Wis. STAT. §310.14 (1963), lists the following as duties of a personal repre-

sentative:

Personal representatives, other than special administrators,
shall collect and possess all the decedent's personal estate except
that selected under s. 313.15(1); inventory and have appraised all
the decedent's estate; collect all income and rent from such estate
of which they have custody; preserve such estate and contest all
claims except claims which they believe are valid and which are not
objected to by an interested person; pay and discharge out of such
estate all expenses of administration, taxes, charges, claims allowed
by the court, or such dividends on claims as directed by the court;
render just and true accounts; make distribution as the court
directs and do such other things as are directed by the court or required by law.

See also

STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN, HANDBOOK FOR WISCONSIN EXECUTORS AND
ADmmNisTRATovs, 2 (1965) which lists the following duties:

1) To take possession and protect the real and personal property,
excepting the homestead and real estate specifically given by
the will.
2) To keep real estate and personal property properly insured.
3) To receive the rents and payments due, and to collect interest,
dividends and other income.
4) To make proper demand and collect all the debts, claims and
notes due.
5) To assist in determining the names, ages, residences and degree
of relationship of all possible heirs.
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those duties do and which do not constitute the practice of law.
The general approach was discussed by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in State ex rel. State Bar v. Keller, 4 in which a layman was not
considered to have been practicing law when he merely investigated
facts for the purpose of reporting the same to his "client" or to use
the information to testify before a court. The layman would be practicing law, however, if he advised his client or others concerning the
rights or liabilities arising from his investigation. The supreme court
directed that the layman should be enjoined
(a) From giving legal advice and instruction to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations;
(b) From the preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
laymen; and
(c) From appearing as an advocate asserting legal rights for a
client before public tribunals which possess power and authority
to determine the rights of such clients according to
25
law.

An examination of the alternative approach to the problem discloses a constantly changing attitude on the part of the court, as to
which of the specific duties of an executor may, or must, be performed
by the executor, rather than by an attorney. The court's early view
was presented in WVill of Willing,2 6 which held generally that it was
the executor's duty to carry out the terms of the will. He could only
retain the advice of counsel, and properly incur the cost of legal expenses, when he reached a point in the execution of the will beyond
which he could not safely proceed. The court stated: "He should not
be expected, of course, to prepare papers relating to court proceedings.
On the other hand, he should transact ordinary business connected
with the estate without the aid of attorneys. This is what he is paid
for."2 '
In a more recent decision, 28 the supreme court recognized that due
to the increased complexity of estates and legal proceedings in general,
it had become more essential for the executor to retain an attorney
6) To litigate or settle any pending lawsuits in which the dead
person had an interest.
7) To keep the property of the estate in good repair.
8) To obey and perform all the orders of the probate court.
9) To determine and pay inheritance, estate and state and federal
income taxes.
10) To pay the valid claims of creditors, and, of necessary, to sell
the estate property to do so.
11) To distribute the remaining assets to the proper heirs.
24 16 Wis. 2d 377, 114 N.W. 2d 796 (1961).
25 Id.
at 389, 90, 114 N.W. 2d at 802.
26 190 Wis. 406, 209 N.W. 602 (1926).
27 Id.
at 414, 209 N.W. at 605.
28 Estate of Braasch, 274 Wis. 569, 80 N.W. 2d 759 (1957).
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than it had been in the past. However, the court still was reluctant to
depart from Will of Willing, stating: "While an executor has the right
to employ an attorney, even where the will does not say so, such au'2
thority is limited to the extent to which legal services are needed. 9
Finally, in Estate-of Thrun, 10 the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that even though it was the usual function of an administratrix
to pay out the distributive shares, there was no impropriety in having
this service done by attorneys.
The court continued:
It would be inappropriate for the attorneys to perform nonlegal services which would ordinarily be done by the administratrix if this were a technique to enlarge the fees charged to the
estate .... In the absence of a showing that excessive fees were
occasioned thereby, we are unable to discern any irregularity in
the administratrix's having her attorney making the disbursement of distributive shares. Indeed, the legal ramifications surrounding the payment of funds to a minor under guardianship
would justify Mrs. Hiller's decision to have her attorneys perform the function.3'
In the instant State ex rel. Baker case, the supreme court answered
the question of when an attorney is necessary by following the second
approach herein discussed, and classified the executor's various functions in two ways; those that must be handled by an attorney, and
those that may be handled by the executor. The court stated:
It may happen, of course,, that in a particular proceeding
there may be no difficult legal problem, and that a particular lay
executor may successfully present the matter in such form as
to protect the rights of everyone ....

Nevertheless, the need for

protection of beneficiaries in general from practice by unlicensed
persons justifies the existence of a general rule and its application to this instance. To require the county court to determine,
case by case, whether an unrepresented executor had properly
protected the rights of all beneficiaries would impose an unmanageable burden.n (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, whenever any function of the executor may be seen to be
a "legal problem," the act must be performed by an attorney. But,
what of those functions that are not "legal problems," but are merely
administrative acts, such as collecting debts, gathering the assets of the
estate, paying claims, or preparing tax returns? The court continued:
We do not say that the submission to the court of every
report in a probate or trust matter
at 572, 80 N.W.
3020 Wis. 2d 275, 121
3"Id. at 279, 280, 121
32State ex rel. Baker
(1965).
29Id.

. . .

constitutes the practice

2d at 761.
N.W. 2d 759 (1963).
N.W. 2d at 761-762.
v. County Court, 29 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 138 N.W. 2d 162, 167
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of law. Whether such activity involves the practice of law in
any particular instance would depend upon the complexity of the
questions which necessarily must be resolved. 33 (Emphasis
added.)
Therefore, unlike matters which are legal problems, there is no
general rule with respect to administrative acts. The need for an executor to act through an attorney in the performance of these acts
depends entirely upon the complexity of the functions involved. The
executor himself may still perform the simpler purely administrative
or managerial acts.
While a certain am6unt of confusion may be caused by attempts
to differentiate between simple and complex non-legal problems, the
reasonableness of the Wisconsin test is underscored when compared
to a similar attempt and its result in Connecticut. The Connecticut
Court, recognizing that a great many problems of a complex nature
arise in the administration of decedent's estates, concluded that whether
the performance of such acts constitutes the practice of law depends
upon whether the acts performed were such as are commonly under34
stood to be the practice of law.
The most jarring aspect of the State ex rel. Baker decision springs
from the supreme court's expansion of the rationale behind the county
court's decision which was, nonetheless, affirmed by the supreme court.
The county court, in refusing to act upon petitioner Baker's petitions,
ruled that he represented the rights of others as an executor, and
therefore was practicing law when he sought an adjudication of their
rights before the court. The supreme court expanded this conclusion,
stating:
It seems to us, however, that there is another basis on which
Judge Roang's action could be sustained in the present case
(where Mr. Baker does represent the interests of others) but
which would also sustain the same action in a situation where
the executor or administrator appears to be the sole beneficiary,
and to represent no other person.35 (Emphasis added.)
At this point, we must emphasize that when the court speaks of the
executor as "representing no other person," it merely intends to say
that there are no beneficiaries or persons directly interested in the
estate other than the executor. The court clearly recognizes, however,
that an executor always represents the interests of society in general,
as well as the rights of persons who are indirectly interested in the
estate, such as those who will demand marketable title to the estate
33 Id. at 9, 10, 138 N.W. 2d at 167.

3 State Bar Association of Connecticut v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145
Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 (1958).
35 State ex rel. Baker v. County Court, 29 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 138 N.W. 2d 162, 171
(1965).
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property in the future 6 Therefore, while the executor might not represent the rights of another particular person in a given situation, the
executor always, by definition of his functions, acts in a representative
capacity for the interests of society and "others" in general.
The "other basis" used by the court in affirming the county court's
action is found in the court's conclusion that a probate court has
inherent power to require the employment of an attorney at various
steps of a particular administrative or probate proceeding, due to the
functions of a probate court in protecting the interests of society in
such matters as the devolution of property, security of title, and rights
of creditors. The court concluded:
We deem the executor or administrator enough the officer
of the court, and the interests of society in the proper transmission of property at death, sufficient that the probate court
37
has inherent power to require such officer to retain counsel.
Upon reading this conclusion, the first thought that comes to mind
is that the supreme court has precluded any possibility of a lay executor performing his functions without first retaining an attorney,
whether he represents the rights of other directly interested persons
or not. In addition, the following language used by the court seems,
on the surface, to require the use of an attorney for all functions of the
probate proceeding, whether those acts require adjudication or merely
involve managing of the estate's assets. The court stated:
There may, of course, be situations where the steps to be
taken are so obviously uncomplicated that the court would have
no hesitancy in entertaining and passing upon the particular petition even though it is not presented by an attorney. But, as previously suggested, to require the county court to determine
case by case, whether each step of a proceeding had been
properly taken would impose an unmanageable burden. 38
Literally, on the basis of this language, it might appear that the
supreme court would require an attorney to perform all acts in the
probate and administration of decedent's estates, by refusing to require
the county court to- assume the burden of deciding which acts may be
performed by an adrhinistrator or executor as well as by an attorney.
This conclusion would seem to exceed the requirements of section
256.03(2), 39 and ignore all prior Wisconsin case law on this subject,
including the earlier part of this decision.
A more careful analysis of the court's language, however, reveals
that the court, in mentioning "passing upon the particular petition. .
38 Id. at 19, 138 N.W. 2d at 172.

37 Ibid.
ss Id. at 18, 138 N.W. 2d at 172.
3
9 Wis. STAT. §256.30(2) (1963) ; see text accompanying note 8 .spra.
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presented . . . in a proceeding" clearly intended to limit its conclusion

to legal matters presented for adjudication by the administrator or
executor, and did not intend, in addition, to encompass purely managerial acts. This interpretation is supported by referring to the nearly
identical language used earlier in the decision by the court, that the
county court would not be given the burden of determining whether
the rights of all beneficiaries had been properly represented by the lay
executor, and that this justified the existence of a general rule re40
quiring an attorney when legal problems were involved.
Therefore, it appears that while using the "inherent power of a
probate court" to justify its conclusion that an attorney is needed even
though the executor does not represent the rights of other persons
directly interested in the estate, the court nevertheless intended that
its test of "legal problem as opposed to complex or simple administrative act" should still be used in determining whether or not an attorney
is needed in a particular situation.
On the basis of this decision, we may conclude that irrespective of
whether or not the executor or administrator of a decedent's estate in
Wisconsin represents the rights of other directly interested persons, or
is a sole beneficiary representing the direct interests of no one but
himself and only the indirect or general interests of society or others,
he must retain an attorney to carry out the administration of the estate
whenever a legal problem is presented to the court, or whenever a complex, as opposed to a simple administrative or custodial act must be
performed.
In effect, the court has concluded that because of the nature of the
executor's position in a probate or administrative proceeding, he necessarily acts as the representative of interests and rights other than his
own. Therefore, while the lay executor may individually perform simple non-legal acts, he must retain licensed legal counsel to perform both
complex non-legal acts and all legal functions, as the latter two functions necessarily involve the interests and rights of others, and constitute the practice of law in probate or administrative proceedings.
THOMiAS E.

40

See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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